Negotiating Positions
George Friedman at Stratfor gives his take on what the US and Iran bring to the table, in the wake of the March 10 chat:
… everyone went out of their way to emphasize that the meetings either did not mean anything or that they were not formally one-on-one, which meant that other parties were present. Such protestations are inevitable: All of the governments involved have substantial domestic constituencies that do not want to see these talks take place, and they must be placated by emphasizing the triviality. Plus … No one buys a used car by emphasizing how important the purchase is.
These protestations are, however, total nonsense. That U.S., Iranian and Syrian diplomats would meet at this time and in that place is of enormous importance … It means the shadowy conversations that have been going on between the United States and Iran in particular are now moving into the public sphere. It means not only that negotiations concerning Iraq are under way, but also that all parties find it important to make these negotiations official. That means progress is being made.
Friedman discusses the fact that US ground forces are hyperextended and limited in their ability to respond to another crisis elsewhere, and that the Russians, well aware of that, are making moves to reassert their influence in Europe and the Middle East.
The fact is that the United States has few viable military options here … In many ways, the U.S. Army is in revolt against the Bush administration. Army officers at all levels (less so the Marines) are using the term “broken” to refer to the condition of the force and are in revolt against the administration — not because of its goals, but because of its failure to provide needed resources nearly six years after 9/11. This revolt is breaking very much into the public domain, and that will further cripple the credibility of the Bush administration.
The “surge” strategy announced late last year was Bush’s last gamble. It demonstrated that the administration has the power and will to defy public opinion — or international perceptions of it — and increase, rather than decrease, forces in Iraq. The Democrats have also provided Bush with a window of opportunity: Their inability to formulate a coherent policy on Iraq has dissipated the sense that they will force imminent changes in U.S. strategy. Bush’s gamble has created a psychological window of opportunity, but if this window is not used, it will close — and, as administration officials have publicly conceded, there is no Plan B. The situation on the ground is as good as it is going to get.
Leaving the question of his own legacy completely aside, Bush knows three things. First, he is not going to impose a military solution on Iraq that suppresses both the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite militias. Second, he has successfully created a fleeting sense of unpredictability, as far as U.S. behavior is concerned. And third, if he does not use this psychological window of opportunity to achieve a political settlement within the context of limited military progress, the moment not only will be lost, but Russia might also emerge as a major factor in the Middle East — eroding a generation of progress toward making the United States the sole major power in that region. Thus, the United States is under geopolitical compulsion to reach a settlement.
Not in agreement on all these points. The military solution part, lack thereof; it is apparent and has been understood from the beginning that military action has to be coupled with a political solution, and that elusive goal is being aggressively pursued. That is why al-Maliki was in Ramadi yesterday in a big public gesture of talking to pro-government Sunni sheiks. That is why they are working on dividing up oil revenues, pressuring the Mahdi Army into disarming, and now, talking to the Iranians. All while wielding a stick that is getting bigger… more troops into Diyala and the Baghdad approaches, taking down car bomb factories and Sunni insurgents who bolted Baghdad. And while the psychological window of opportunity may appear to be brief from this side, that is an open question depending entirely on the progress they make. So far, progress is good. Confidence is being restored, and the opposition, from the Democratic Congress on one side to Shiite militias, Sunni insurgents and Iran on the other, is where signs of weakness and willingness to accommodate are being shown.
On the condition of the U.S. military, it has been apparent for a long time that it needs to be made larger and refitted. Bush got rid of one obstacle … Donald Rumsfeld … after he inherited another, the anti-war Congress. Current plans to grow and refit the military are too modest. But discussions I’ve seen and heard citing militry officers past and present generally reject ”broken” in favor of “tired” as a description of the condition of the US military.
OK, on to Friedman’s take on Iran:
The Iranians are also under pressure. They have miscalculated on what Bush would do: They expected military drawdown, and instead they got the surge. This has conjured up memories of the miscalculation on what the 1979 hostage crisis would bring: The revolutionaries had bet on a U.S. capitulation, but in the long run they got an Iraqi invasion and Ronald Reagan.
Expediency Council Chairman Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani already has warned the Iranians not to underestimate the United States, saying it is a “wounded tiger” and therefore much more dangerous than otherwise. In addition, the Iranians know some important things.
… Uncontrolled chaos next door could spill over into Iran in numerous ways — separatist sentiments among the Kurds, the potential return of a Sunni government if the Shia are too fractured to govern, and so forth. A certain level of security in Iraq is fundamental to Iran’s national interests.
… there are concerns that Iraq’s Shia are so fractious that they might not be serviceable as a coherent vehicle for Iranian power.
… Finally, Iran’s ability to threaten terror strikes against U.S. interests depends to a great extent on Hezbollah … far more interested in the power and wealth to be found in Lebanon than in some global — and potentially catastrophic — war against the United States. The Iranian leadership has seen al Qaeda’s leaders being hunted and hiding in Pakistan, and they have little stomach for that. In short, Iranian leaders might not have all the options they would like to pretend they have …
… Iran has sufficient power to block a settlement on Iraq, but it lacks the ability to impose one of its own making. Second, Hezbollah is far from willing to play the role of global suicide bomber to support Iranian ambitions. Third, an Iranian nuclear bomb is far from being a reality. Finally, Iran has, in the long run, much to fear from the Russians: Moscow is far more likely than Washington to reduce Iran to a vassal state …
… Each side (US and Iran) is signaling a re-evaluation of the other and a degree of flexibility in outcomes.
… If the current crisis continues, each side might show itself much weaker than it wants to appear. The United States could find itself in a geopolitical spasm, coupled with a domestic political crisis. Iran could find itself something of a toothless tiger — making threats that are known to have little substance behind them. The issue is what sort of settlement there could be.
We see the following points as essential to the two main players:
1. The creation of an Iraqi government that is dominated by Shia, neutral to Iran, hostile to jihadists but accommodating to some Sunni groups.
2. Guarantees for Iran’s commercial interests in southern Iraqi oil fields, with some transfers to the Sunnis (who have no oil in their own territory) from fields in both the northern (Kurdish) and southern (Shiite) regions.
3. Guarantees for U.S. commercial interests in the Kurdish regions.
4. An Iraqi military without offensive capabilities, but substantial domestic power. This means limited armor and air power, but substantial light infantry.
5. An Iraqi army operated on a “confessional” basis — each militia and insurgent group retained as units and controlling its own regions.
6. Guarantee of a multiyear U.S. presence, without security responsibility for Iraq, at about 40,000 troops.
7. A U.S.-Iranian “commission” to manage political conflict in Iraq.
8. U.S. commercial relations with Iran.
9. The definition of the Russian role, without its exclusion.
10. A meaningless but symbolic commitment to a new Israeli-Palestinian peace process.Such an agreement would not be expected to last very long. It might last, but the primary purpose would be to allow each side to quietly fold its busted flushes in the game for Iraq.
A lot of interesting points. I’d suggest that Iran is interested in short- to mid-term chaos in Iraq as a means to achieving its longer term goal of US out and an Iranian-dominated Shia government, but Iran sees that prospect diminishing under the surge and also wants to head off airstrikes that could cause major damage to its nuclear program, military and other infrastructure. They have wanted to talk from a position of strength, and very much want to talk now because they see that slipping away. Not convinced of the concern about being hunted like al-Qaeda comes from, when Friedman has just observed that the US military isn’t up to it. The suggested settlement terms don’t mention Iranian nukes, which become a destabilizing factor. Maybe the answer to that, if the military option is set aside, is the Arabian nuke. US-Soviet, India-Pak style detente, but less attractive in a world of nihilistic non-state actors that both sides flirt with if not actively underwrite.
Friedman sees this very much as two weakened players trying to make the best of a bad lot. It could be that way, but I’d suggest the militry and political developments we’ve seen at home and in Iraq and Iran in the last two months indicate Bush’s political and military hand re Iraq is strengthening considerably. The conditions for settlement have not been fully established yet, but it is his to lose.
Stratfor had a March 12 news summary that included this:
The United States and Iran will hold meetings in Washington regarding Iraqi security and stability, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s office said, quoting U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad. No details regarding a date for the meeting or who will attend were available.
Haven’t seen that elsewhere. Also, Iran short another ranking officer.
Meanwhile, here’s an AP analysis of the U.S.-Iran talks cites cool down. Key points:
• The Iraq neighbors’ conference in Baghdad. Although U.S. and Iranian officials exchanged sharp words at one point, both seemed open afterward to continued interaction. President Bush called the talks constructive, and U.S. envoy David Satterfield said he expected more.
One Arab diplomat who was briefed by participants, speaking anonymously Tuesday because he was not authorized to talk publicly, said the talks among Iran, Syria and the United States were substantive and addressed several Iraq-related issues.
• Russia’s new stance. Russia, a key ally of the Tehran regime, criticized Iran in unusually strong language this week for failing to meet U.N. deadlines for curbing its controversial nuclear program, and also announced it would delay assistance to an Iranian nuclear plant. That angered Iran, but is also likely to give it pause, and perhaps moderate its position.
• Iran’s own internal changes. Hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has softened his attacks on the West after internal criticism that he was jeopardizing the country. His main political rival, former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, supports a more conciliatory stance toward the Arab world and the West, in particular spearheading recent talks with U.S.-allied Saudi Arabia aimed at defusing Mideast tensions.
• The U.S. approach. Three months after Bush brushed aside suggestions he engage Iran in efforts to stabilize Iraq, his administration is doing essentially that - apparently because it believes it now holds a better diplomatic hand than in December.
His administration remains under political pressure at home to counter Iran’s rise as a regional power.
“There are enough negatives (to any U.S. military strike at Iran) that if the Iranians seem to be willing to step back a bit, there is a new willingness in Washington to see how far you can take that,” said Alterman.
… (but)
Iran is unlikely to back away from its goals - increasing its own regional influence and pushing forward with a nuclear program that Washington and others suspect aims to produce atomic weapons.
In its anger with Russia, Iran could even become more confrontational in the short term. Its foreign minister accused Israel and the United States on Tuesday of posing the main threats to the Mideast, prompting the U.S. and Israeli delegations to walk out of his speech at a Geneva forum.
Nor is there any sign Washington will back down from its insistence on curbing Iran’s nuclear program.
Just two months ago, the United States moved a second aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf in a sharp signal to Iran. It has arrested Iranians in Iraq, and accuses Iran of arming and training militants there to attack American soldiers with sophisticated roadside bombs. It also continues to push hard for new U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran.
Posted by Jules Crittenden at 10:25 am on Wednesday, March 14, 2007
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March 14th, 2007 at 7:32 pm
This is like one of those movies where the bad guy gets the drop on a good guy, but another good guy sneaks up behind and puts his gun to the head of the bad guy, and then another bad guy sneaks up behind that good guy and…