Non Cents
Frank Hoffman at Small Wars Journal shoots down USAF Gen. Charles Dunlap as Dunlap attempts to execute a strafing run on ground forces engaged in counter-insurgency. Hoffman reckons its a fit of pique over air power being relegated to a supporting role. Great mudwrestling at SWJ as always, though I disagree with both Dunlap and Hoffman on the idea that a ” ‘traditional land component solution’ … is too costly for America, and is far too late for Iraq … “
Topics: military
Posted by Jules Crittenden at 9:58 am on Wednesday, May 23, 2007
16 Responses to “Non Cents”
Leave a Reply
Trackback URLYou must be logged in to post a comment.
May 23rd, 2007 at 3:01 pm
“Hoffman reckons its a fit of pique over air power being relegated to a supporting role.”
Alas, Dunlap’s article is but a continuation of the long standing game of “King of the Mountain” between the Air Force and the other services. What a lot of AF officers (not to mention many politicians and a significant portion of Americans) haven’t grasped is that you can’t control an objective by air power alone; you have to put a rifle tottin’ 19 year old soldier or Marine on that objective. Air power simply helps the put that rifleman on the objective. Please note that I said “simply”, not “insignificantly”.
Even Kosovo wasn’t exclusively an air power victory; we still have ground troops stationed there to (sort of) secure the region. At most, air power might destroy an installation; it can’t control the terrain that installation was on.
It may be better to say that Dunlap is piqued because the ground forces are getting more attention than the Air Force, which does play a critical role, be it transporting troops or essential supplies, or dropping smart bombs on stupid terrorists. More attention means more funds. Or at least a higher priority for funds. The new counterinsurgency FM is a forerunner of the next battle for supremacy of the DoD budget.
May 23rd, 2007 at 3:59 pm
The ghost of Air Chief Marshal Trenchard, RAF, haunts us still.
Cheers
May 23rd, 2007 at 4:21 pm
Shipmates,
The myth of Strategic Bombing being able to win a war is still a large part of the USAF Bible. The worst day for American miltary forces was the day the Air Force was turned into a seperate branch of service.
Since that day, untold billions of dollars have been sucked into a wasteland of failed trechnology and over-priced, gee-whiz systems. The USAF has diverted uncountable dollars into “quality of life” issues that give their personell beautiful clubs, manicured golf courses and all sorts of luxuries, while war-making systems and support infrastructure goes begging.
The USAF is grossly inflated with higher-ranking officers, to the extent that a group photograph of every O-6 and above would form an outline not unlike Jabba the Hutt. Meanwhile, rank & file stagnate at lower pay grades whilst sister-service people with comparable skills and paygrades attain regular advancement.
If this nation is serious about trimming pork from the Defense Budget, then it’s first course of action should be to disestablish the USAF as a seperate Branch, and fold the various components back into the Army and Navy.
The Air Force currently takes up an inordinate, unsustainable amount of dollars, and despite the quality of it’s lower ranks, seems to view petulance as a defining, positve quality, rivalled only by sheer aristocratic cluelessness among it’s senior leadership.
Respects,
May 23rd, 2007 at 10:29 pm
Jules,
Thanks once again for a link back. FYI - MG Dunlap responded to “Non Cents” in the comments section…
Best,
Dave
May 24th, 2007 at 3:00 am
There is a reason why AF personnel are regularly referred to as Air Force pukes. AW1 Tim gives as good a rehearsal of those reasons as any I’ve heard. It’s a shame, too, because they’ve got good people in the lower ranks.
May 24th, 2007 at 6:01 am
Its stands to reason the most collateral damage you can get from a misplaced bullet, is one person, perhaps two when its a really unlucky shot.
May 24th, 2007 at 7:19 am
Turf Battle?
Jules Crittenden links to a very interesting and revealing discussion on how best to conduct a counter-insurgency campaign. What I think some of the commentators are missing is the audience to whom the various remarks are addressed: The Army/USMC folks…
May 24th, 2007 at 8:04 am
Jules,
SaltyDog hits true. They have some VERY fine people in the ranks. Hardworking, dedictated folks who keep that AF machine running. I’ve had personal experience with many AF men and women in my day, and every one was good at what they did.
Having said that, nowever, it’s the upper leadership that is bloated and stifling the service(s). The USAF has an abundace of )-6 and above, far out of line with it’s actual needs. This alone is a financial drain, due to salaries and retirement benefits. It also is a self-perpetuating beauracracy that has the typical result of increasing both the gobbledy-gook language of acronyms and project names, but has the added component of padding stats and qualifications in order to justify those same people and projects, and sustain budgets.
The USAF, if nothing else, needs a smassive house-cleaning. A purge of officers in sernior positions, and a reduction in the “management” wing of their service.
In the long run, I still believe that this nation will be best served by ending the failed experiment of a seperate air force, and folding those roles back into the Army and Navy.
Respects,
May 24th, 2007 at 8:23 am
Shipmates,
Lest my earstwhile commenting friends think that I am just piping the old anti-AF rhetoric, let me be a little more candid here.
The myth of strategic bombing being an effective way to end a conflict, to even force an end to a conflict was put to rest after World War II through an exhaustive recapitulation of the results of Allied bombing campaigns.
Though causing significant structural damage and massive scarring of the landscape of Europe, and especially Germany, Allied bombing campaigns did not significantly result in German production losses or even technical advancement. The targeting of infrastructure simply forced the ZGerman to adapt to different methods to protect war material and workers. They did this by going underground, as well as distributing production of various components throughout a given area, rather than concentrating them in large factory complexes.
By war’s end, German aircraft production, for example, had actually INCREASED, despite constant attempts by Allied Strategig Bombing efforts to destroy it.
What ended the war? Large ground forces, both in the west and the east, inexorably grinding down German military forces wherever they could be located and engaged. basically, the Allies put more bodies in the line than the Germans had bullets. It was a war of both maneuver AND attrition, and the Allies triumphed because of it.
Strategic bombing, and extended war-fighting through air assetts, can only accomplisgh we can destroy a transportation nexus, that matters little to an enemy who regularly uses manpower or low-tech transport systems, espcially animals. They simply go around it. We learned this in the Pacific, as well as in Korea and Vietnam. It took soldiers and marines on the ground to physically interdict these supply lines.
It is also is very ineffective against a highly-mobile adversary, especially one with significant airmobile capabilities. There again, damage to fixed points might alter the terrain, but the warfighters, like water, simply flow around the obstacles.
The only remaining use for manned bombers on the strategic level, is that of massive nuclear retalion, where manned, recallable platforms are required for fail-safe reasons. Beyond that, tactical air assets would best be utilized by blending into the armed services that need them, such as the US Army, where they can consitantly train alongside those they are intended to support.
That, right there, is the crux of the problem. The Air Force can only serve as a supporting force. It cannot, by itself, win any conflict, or even reasonably influence one, short of total nuclear engagement. Even then, it will still require men with rifles to secure areas.
Respects,
May 24th, 2007 at 8:37 am
AWI Tim,
Not to mention the Linebacker campaign in Vietnam, in which (I think it was) more ordinance than was dropped on Japan in WWII was dropped on North Vietnam in twelve days. Yet, because the adversary was, again, highly mobile and not very industrialized, the bombings had little effect compared to ground forces backed by helicopter.
May 24th, 2007 at 9:06 am
The AF General’s intended audience is Congress (and the MSM), not those interested in an actual strategic discussion, because as has been pointed out above air power can not supplant boots in the mud and the General full well knows this. Sadly, as is often the case with Brass, the main war he is concerned with winning is the one over the budget, and as he quite correctly reckons that the “Bring the troops home” crowd is also the “keep the troops home” crowd and thus quite amenable to the siren call of ‘low risk’ air superiority doctrine. It’s all about the politics. No offense or disrespect intended to the General, who is looking out for his own, but that’s my reading between the lines.
May 24th, 2007 at 9:55 am
Correct, Mr. Bingley. General Dunlap is attempting to use the anti-war rhetoric to influence the neverending budget wars in favor of the Air Force.
In short, General Dunlap seems to be pandering to Congress (in part through the MSM) to get his budget increased. He looks to be doing an end run around DoD to do so. I have to wonder if the DoD Secretary hasn’t made a call to Dunlap about this; this is fairly open on Dunlap’s part, although not a direct call to Congress. Shinseki did just that with the Army’s Crusader program, and got himself in seriously hot water.
May 24th, 2007 at 5:46 pm
AW1 Tim
Just a minor correction. Industrial output in wartime Germany rose until Jan 45, whereupon it began a precipitous fall. This was seen by some as confirmation of the strat bombing campaign; however the start of the decline coincided with the crossing of the national German frontier, and the speed of the fall correlated with the capture of German territory. In other words, boots on the ground did the job.
Cheers
May 24th, 2007 at 7:18 pm
“you have to put a rifle tottin’ 19 year old soldier or Marine on that objective. ”
How about a carbine totin’ 38 year old Major? Heh.
I saw the Air Force struggling mightily to become the Executive Agency at Bagram and Khandahar Airfields - despite the fact that the Army (plus some Marines) were most of the presence at both installations. I don’t know why the feelings of inferiority…they were/are playing an important part in the fight.
Sigh.
May 24th, 2007 at 10:38 pm
J.M. Heinrichs,
Absolutely, and rereading my post, it seems I managed to delete and entire section…. sigh…
I would like to blame the current condition of my eyes, rcovering from retinal surgery, but truth be told, it was more of haste to post the dasrned thing. That’s a sin I’m trying hard to correct, but apparently it’ll take some time:)
I would also add that the losses during the Ardennes Offensive played a significant part in that collapse. There simply wasn’t enough forces left to hold the British and American forces at bay, AND deal with the advancing Soviets at the same time.
It’s always been an interesting discussion to consider what might have happened in the west had the Germans NOT conducted an offensive, but had rather held their lines, kept a significant mobile reserve, and played a defensive game while dealing with the Soviets in the east.
Thanks for the correction, and I remain,
Respectfully,
May 24th, 2007 at 11:35 pm
“How about a carbine totin’ 38 year old Major? Heh.”
Heh! Much better than a pistol packin’ 48 year old light colonel. And that was a couple years ago. BUAWHAHAHAHAHA!!!!