Now You See Him
Mookie reappears, still wants us out. It’s a bit of a broken record. The interesting part is that he wants to lead a big Sunni-Shia reconciliation. John Burns at NYT more correctly calls al-Sadr’s Sunni outreach a “new guise.”
I’d guess it means al-Sadr is afraid events are getting away from him. If there is going to be Sunni-Shiite reconciliation, he wants it to be all about him. Reminds me of some rogue clerics closer to home.
Burns suggests he’s back and making a move because everyone was whispering behind his back and he was losing his power base. We knew that already, and its the manner in which he choses to respond to that is not really explained. I’d suggest this could be a very favorable development, because if al-Sadr views Sunni-Shiite reconciliation as something he needs to gain control of, that suggests a serious shift may be underway in Parliament, among other power players and among the people of Iraq. Things we’ve already seen hints of in al-Maliki’s belated break from al-Sadr and concessions to Sunnis, as well as the turn of the Sunni tide in Anbar. Washington Post reminds us that not only is his rival al-Hakim out of the country, but he’s also been striking a nationalist pose.
Gateway: “This was supposed to be his day!” Party-pooping Brits off one of Mookie’s top commanders.
Stratfor reckons this is all linked to the U.S.-Iran talks, and al-Sadr is positioning himself to be part of a new government they will cook up. Stratfor makes Iran sound way too sensible and seems very enthusiastic about these talks. All I have to say is, beware of mullahs, or rogue clerics, bearing gifts:
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki submitted to Iraq’s legislature May 24 a list of six ministers to fill the vacancies left after radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr’s political bloc pulled out of the Cabinet. Al-Maliki also announced that additional changes to his Cabinet are in the works. The Cabinet changes are small compared to the shifts in the Iraqi political system that will result from negotiations between the United States and Iran, prospective changes that motivated al-Sadr’s pullout from the al-Maliki government.
… The Iranians have relayed to Washington their willingness to replace al-Maliki himself as part of a negotiated settlement, on the condition that his successor not be a former Baathist. Such a deal could not have happened unless Tehran had come to an understanding with al-Maliki and his Hizb al-Dawah party. The new power-sharing mechanism at the intercommunal level will first require a brand new power-sharing formula at the intra-Shiite level, something the Iranians are in the middle of overseeing.
The temporary nature of the current setup would explain why al-Sadr’s bloc withdrew from the government in April. Aware that a new power-sharing deal with a greater Sunni presence is in the making, al-Sadr’s bloc decided there was no point in continuing as part of al-Maliki’s administration. The pullout allows the al-Sadrites time to focus on settling their movement’s internal problems. Elsewhere, al-Sadr’s bloc is negotiating with Sunni tribal elements fighting the jihadists and hence emerging as a political force.
Al-Sadr’s bloc is doing al-Maliki and the Iraqi Shiite establishment a favor as they face pressure to do better at governing Iraq — a favor al-Sadr will call in later. Put differently, al-Sadr is giving al-Maliki the room he needs to demonstrate to the United States that the Iraqi government can function.
Under the current Cabinet setup, al-Sadr’s bloc has lacked ministries of any consequence. The al-Sadrites are likely to jockey for more powerful portfolios in the future setup. In this regard, once al-Sadr’s militia has been purged of rogue elements, it might be incorporated into state security apparatus. This is something the Iranians have offered to help the United States accomplish as part of a proposed framework of talks that Tehran gave to Washington at the meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, earlier in May.
By allowing al-Maliki to fill in these positions with technocrats, al-Sadr can uphold his legitimacy among his own Shiite constituency by showing he has not sold out but has stuck to his demands for a U.S. withdrawal before the al-Sadrites participate in the government. By holding out for a comprehensive agreement worked out between Iran and the United States (something Tehran probably is assuring al-Sadr will occur), al-Sadr also is protecting the interests of his own movement. The radical Shiite leader also would want to take advantage of the illness of his main rival and Iraq’s most powerful Shiite leader, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim.
Ultimately, the Iraqi government that emerges from a U.S. and Iranian accommodation will be the genuine article, as opposed to the cosmetic changes to the current political order, Iraq’s fourth post-Baathist interim government.
Topics: Iraq
Posted by Jules Crittenden at 11:43 pm on Friday, May 25, 2007
2 Responses to “Now You See Him”
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May 26th, 2007 at 12:20 am
Yo Mookie, it really would be a shame if youse was to get blowed up by a car bomb before enjoying dis new power wouldn’t it?
May 26th, 2007 at 12:35 pm
Could he not be back as a part of the reported summer campaign against the Americans? The Dhim Cong need a big show for the fall.