No Vietnamization of Iraq
Some clarity from Kissinger:
THE IRAQ WAR has reawakened memories of the Vietnam War, the most significant political experience of an entire American generation. But this has not produced clarity about its lessons.
Of course, history never repeats itself exactly. Vietnam and Iraq are different conflicts in different times, but there is an important similarity: A point was reached during the Vietnam War when the domestic debate became so bitter as to preclude rational discussion of hard choices. Administrations of both political parties perceived the survival of South Vietnam as a significant national interest. They were opposed by a protest movement that coalesced behind the conviction that the war reflected an amorality that had to be purged by confrontational methods. This impasse doomed the U.S. effort in Vietnam; it must not be repeated over Iraq.
This is why a brief recapitulation of the Indochina tragedy is necessary.
It must begin with dispelling the myth that the Nixon administration settled in 1972 for terms that had been available in 1969 and therefore prolonged the war needlessly. Whether the agreement, officially signed in January 1973, could have preserved an independent South Vietnam and avoided the carnage following the fall of Indochina will never be known. We do know that American disunity prevented such an outcome when Congress prohibited the use of military force to maintain the agreement and cut off aid after all U.S. military forces (except a few hundred advisors) had left South Vietnam. American dissociation triggered a massive North Vietnamese invasion, in blatant violation of existing agreements, to which the nations that had endorsed these agreements turned their backs.
… A strategic design cannot be achieved on a fixed, arbitrary deadline; it must reflect conditions on the ground. But it also must not test the endurance of the American public to a point where the outcome can no longer be sustained by our political process. In Iraq, rapid, unilateral withdrawal would be disastrous. At the same time, a political solution remains imperative.
A political settlement has to be distilled from the partly conflicting, partly overlapping views of the Iraqi parties, Iraq’s neighbors and other affected states, based on a conviction that the caldron of Iraq would otherwise overflow and engulf everybody. The essential prerequisite is staying power in the near term. President Bush owes it to his successor to make as much progress toward this goal as possible; not to hand the problem over but to reduce it to more manageable proportions. What we need most is a rebuilding of bipartisanship in both this presidency and in the next.
In short, let’s not turn Iraq into another Vietnam. A precipitous withdrawal based on petulant domestic politics will do that. As Neoneocon notes in her discussion of same, Kissinger is everyone’s favorite whipping boy and he’s also been keenly interested in self-redemption, but his fundamental conclusion here is correct. Be interesting to see how the lefties who crowed over his earlier somewhat misunderstood “victory no longer possible” remarks on the subject look at this, as he adjusts his views to address facts on the ground in Washington and Iraq. Here’s the whole thing.
Posted by Jules Crittenden at 2:55 pm on Friday, June 1, 2007
7 Responses to “No Vietnamization of Iraq”
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June 1st, 2007 at 4:24 pm
Yep, read it at LAT, already…this should bring alf and corn, soon. 7-6-5-4…
June 1st, 2007 at 6:22 pm
Excerpt from the Indochina section of the briefing book for Kissinger’s July 1971 trip, POLO I [Part I]:
On behalf of President Nixon I want to assure the [Chinese] prime minister [Zhou] solemnly that the United States is prepared to make a settlement that will truly leave the political evolution of South Vietnam to the Vietnamese alone. We are ready to withdraw all of our forces by a fixed date and let objective realities shape the political future. . . .
We want a decent interval. You have our assurance.
June 1st, 2007 at 6:38 pm
We are ready to withdraw all of our forces by a fixed date and let objective realities shape the political future. . . .
If this isn’t a condemnation of the Doomicrats’ position, I don’t know what is.
President Bush owes it to his successor to make as much progress toward this goal as possible; not to hand the problem over but to reduce it to more manageable proportions.
This statement ought to be directed at today’s Congress as much as at Bush. And the statement could end this way: “And Congress should not impede these efforts, but rather should support what is necessary to effect a lasting political solution in Iraq which will benefit, first the country they represent, and secondly the region and the world.” This might, however, entail the work of actually studying the region and making hard, informed choices.
June 1st, 2007 at 10:54 pm
Already saw it, El Cid.
Take notes from the master.
Thrity years from now, you guys will still be explaining why turning Iraq into a radical Shiite theocracy looked like a good idea at the time.
Sample future response to your lame rationalizations:
“You’re a moron, grandpa.”
June 2nd, 2007 at 4:55 am
“Thrity years from now, you guys will still be explaining why turning Iraq into a radical Shiite theocracy looked like a good idea at the time.”
We can destroy radical Shiite states that help terrorists kill Americans just as easily as we can destroy Baathist states that do so.
You could ask the former head of Baathist Iraq about that, but I understand he’s no longer available for comment.
June 2nd, 2007 at 7:04 pm
“But this has not produced clarity about its lessons.”
Yeah, the lesson is is that we win, the commies lose, no matter what happens in the short run.
Ask the Soviets about it.
Whether or not you can see it is of no consequence. We’re going to win over the long run.
Same deal re: Iraq.
June 2nd, 2007 at 7:08 pm
“Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you”–Nikita Khruschev, former head commie of the now defunct U.S.S.R.
Wanna bet?