Iran Talk
Stratfor weighs in with a little realpolitik re Iran and Pakistan:
On Monday, we left our readers with this thought about relations between the United States and Iran: “The trick is telling the difference between war rhetoric that precedes a settlement and war rhetoric that precedes, well, a war.” The problem at hand is that efforts to strike a U.S.-Iranian deal over the future of Iraq sound, by design, like war drums.
However, on Tuesday, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari both called for a second public round of direct talks between top-level U.S. and Iranian policymakers. And as recently as Monday, Washington made clear that it would welcome such contact. Certainly sounds like negotiations (as opposed to war) to us.
While many think the United States and Iran are implacable foes, the room for cooperation between the two countries really is quite cavernous. Iran is a Shiite Persian island in a sea of Sunni Arabs. Despite bad blood between Tehran and Washington, the United States has never occupied Iran. The two have never fought a war, and certainly not one as devastating as Iran’s 1980-1988 conflict with Iraq, which claimed more than 1 million Iranian lives. In fact, their long-term strategic goals — to prevent a major resurgence of Russian power and to minimize the impact of the Sunni Islamic militancy — are broadly in sync, and in the past, Washington has counted itself among Tehran’s firmest allies.
… Bear in mind that part of any deal struck over Iraq will be preparing the U.S. and Iranian publics for semi-friendly communication with a country that has been regularly lambasted as an agent of evil.
Such public perceptions often have a tendency to develop lives of their own, and so it is in Pakistan. A suicide bombing on Tuesday targeted a rally set to be attended by Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, the Pakistani chief justice who was deposed in March by President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, setting off a countrywide political crisis. The bombing — which occurred after Islamist-related violence over the weekend left more than 80 people dead — has deepened concerns in the country that Musharraf is losing control. As well it should; the president is losing control.
Musharraf faces two problems, one political and one structural.
… The one thing that could rebuild his credibility is more raids like those he carried out against Muslim extremists holed up in the Red Mosque in early July. Many within Pakistan — even among the political opposition — applauded Musharraf’s tough stance against radical Islamists who defied the power of the state. But the problem with replicating this event is at the core of Musharraf’s second hurdle.
Such military operations will continue in Pakistan, since Musharraf sees them as the only way to extend his time in office. But that does not mean they will succeed. Much of the Pakistani system — most notably, the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence agency — is sprinkled with Islamist-minded personnel whose presence has regularly hindered operations against Muslim militants in the country’s northwest.
Intelligence agencies only operate well when they excel at covert action and keeping secrets. Hence, if even 1 percent of personnel are willing to leak information to potential targets, the entire intelligence infrastructure becomes useless. The Red Mosque operation was possible only because the mosque leaders were helpful enough to lock themselves inside and broadcast their defiance to the world. Stratfor’s feeling is that other extremist groups in Pakistan — al Qaeda comes to mind — will not be quite so helpful or stationary in the future.
Without such intelligence, a military crackdown against extremists is almost guaranteed to fail in reality, and it will be even more unsuccessful in the minds of the already disenchanted Pakistani public. This means the world needs to start thinking about what Pakistan will look like without Musharraf.
First, the U.S.-NATO operation in Afghanistan would be impossible without the supply lines that pass through Pakistan — lines that only exist because of an understanding established between Musharraf and the White House hours after the 9/11 attacks.
Pakistan is a tough nut. The calculation thus far is that Musharraf’s benign dictatorship with moderate containment of Islamic extremists is better than an Islamic extremist dictatorship … which the Iranian and Palestinian examples suggest is what you end up with whether you have votes or not. Musharraf has had some success in sidelining ISI extremists in the past. I’d suggest an Islamic terrorist campaign will play in Musharraf’s favor, strengthening his law-and-order claim to power.
Re Iran, the idea of talks is roughly equivalent to talks with the Soviet Union. None of which prevented decades of proxy wars, strong-arming, clock-and-dagger skulduggery, but kept the nuclear tensions at a manageable level. Stratfor does not mention Iran’s alleged support of al-Qaeda, which tends to undercut the idea that we can rely on Iran to act with us against that threat. I’d suggest any talks or resulting agreement are unlikely to diminish the mullahs’ appetite for terrorism and desire for regional dominance. Iran views talks as another weapon to wield against the United States, to lull and limit adversary and effect its goals by other, less expensive and dangerous means. The goal being us out, and Iran on top.
We should view and use any talks the same way. As rope to be paid out in sufficient lengths for the Iranians to hang themselves with. No one should fool themselves any agreement will reflect an actual resolution.
Posted by Jules Crittenden at 9:45 am on Wednesday, July 18, 2007
5 Responses to “Iran Talk”
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July 18th, 2007 at 10:18 am
This statement from Stratfor re Iran is silly: “In fact, their long-term strategic goals — to prevent a major resurgence of Russian power and to minimize the impact of the Sunni Islamic militancy — are broadly in sync.”
I think Iran wants a stronger Russia (and China), so that there is a counterweight that it can use to deter or resist US action against Iran. As to the Sunni Islamic militancy, I do not think they are seriously worried about it. Indeed, it is a useful tool to use against American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan at the present. Sunni Islamic militancy could conceivably constitute a more serious threat to Iran some day - but that is a pretty big question mark. Insurgencies are not a serious threat to a ruthless dictatorship. In the present, Iran is focused on expanding its influence in the region (and is succeeding brilliantly) - not worrying about defense against Sunni Islamic militancy.
There is very little overlap (if any) between our interests and those of the Mullahs in Iran. Any “agreement” we made with them would not be upheld because of the lack of overlapping interests. I agree with you Jules that:
“Iran views talks as another weapon to wield against the United States, to lull and limit adversary and effect its goals by other, less expensive and dangerous means. The goal being us out, and Iran on top.”
July 18th, 2007 at 1:50 pm
One of the seminal truths President Bush spoke about when he introduced the Bush Doctrine was that we got where we are because of the “realist” school of diplomacy that continue to treat with murderers and liars in the face of ample evidence that they were murderers and liars. In doing so, we sacrificed our moral foundations to an avowed enemy that is more experienced and much better at playing the Janus face game of diplomacy than we are. Indeed, it is written into their religion.
This war is what comes from thinking that the good has anything to gain from giving sanction to evil. Notice that no where in Stratfor’s evaluation do they have anything to say about whether dealing with those who have been behind most of the conflict the world faces is the morally right thing to do in the first place. What kind of evasion does it take to deny a war that has been on-going for over 30 years? How big does the body count have to become before the blinkers come off? Or do they think, like the rest of the “realist” world, that one may ignore moral right, the same way they ignore reality, with impunity?
July 18th, 2007 at 3:04 pm
They really should be thinking about what Pakistan will be like without Musharraf, because the man is mortal. Will we better be able to take on an extremist, nuclear Pakistan with extremist, nuclear Iran in the neighborhood, or with a pacified, cooperative Iran?
July 18th, 2007 at 8:50 pm
Stratfor seems to have forgotten the Operation Praying Mantis in the 1980s, the afternoon where the USN sank an Iranian frigate, severely damaged a second frigate, sunk several Boghammars, and took out a couple of oil platforms. We’ve been fighting a war with Iran … on those rare days when we have enough gumption to actually retaliate for their many, many hostile acts.
Negotiations with the Iranian government are pointless.
July 18th, 2007 at 9:19 pm
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