About Face?
Boston University Prof. Andrew Bacevich, who famously has not liked this war, and slammed those who call for more troops, now argues a case for both, though he appears to frames it disingenuously simply to use it to attack the general whose effort is turning this war around. Ultimately, though, I’m not entirely sure which side he’s arguing, and I don’t think he is either.
It almost feels like he’s trying to come over, and looking for reasons not to.
Bacevich on calls for expansion of the Army and combating Islamic extremism with force of arms, June 18, 2007:
This is sheer twaddle, as events in Iraq have manifestly shown.
…
Those who in the absence of serious strategic analysis reflexively posture about the need for more troops deserve only contempt.
Bacevich on Petraeus, Washington and Iraq, October 5, 2007:
After the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, to sustained bipartisan applause, President Bush committed the United States to an open-ended global war on terror. Having made that fundamental decision, the president and Congress sent American soldiers off to fight that war while urging the American people to distract themselves with other pursuits. The American people have done as they were asked.
The result, six years later, is a massive and growing gap between the resources required to sustain that global war, in Iraq and elsewhere, and the resources actually available to do so …
The president has made no serious effort to mobilize the wherewithal that his wars in Iraq and Afghanistan require. The Congress, liberal Democrats voting aye, has made itself complicit in this shameful policy by obligingly appropriating whatever sums of money the president has requested, all, of course, in the name of “supporting the troops.”
Petraeus has now given this charade a further lease on life. In effect, he is allowing the president and the Congress to continue dodging the main issue, which comes down to this: if the civilian leadership wants to wage a global war on terror and if that war entails pacifying Iraq, then let’s get serious about providing what’s needed to complete the mission—starting with lots more soldiers. Rather than curtailing the ostensibly successful surge, Petraeus should broaden and deepen it. That means sending more troops to Iraq, not bringing them home. And that probably implies doubling or tripling the size of the United States Army on a crash basis.
Almost sounds like Bacevich suddenly likes Iraq. But it appears that Bacevich, in criticizing Petraeus for failing to deliver a sufficiently tough message, is using the tactic favored by those who counsel a draft. Not because they want the Army to be bigger or the war to be won, quite the opposite. They want their political opponents to launch a suicidal banzai charge. Next graph:
If the civilian leadership is unwilling to provide what’s needed, then all of the talk about waging a global war on terror—talk heard not only from the president but from most of those jockeying to replace him—amounts to so much hot air. Critics who think the concept of the global war on terror is fundamentally flawed will see this as a positive development. Once we recognize the global war on terror for the fraudulent enterprise that it has become, then we can get serious about designing a strategy to address the threat that we actually face, which is not terrorism but violent Islamic radicalism. The antidote to Islamic radicalism, if there is one, won’t involve invading and occupying places like Iraq.
Bacevich neglects to point it out, but he has been one of those critics. And he moves into the suggestion of fighting to win with another extensive reference to critics, those who said Petraeus was full of it.
One critical miscalculation. Bacevich interprets the Bush/Petraeus nod to Congress with a token/maybe withdrawal as political caving and a failure to support their own strategy. I’d suggest, particularly given the highly conditional nature of the withdrawal proposal and the push to hasten the expansion of the Army, it was a bone thrown to buy time. It was a manuever to ensure that the war effort is not abandoned, and that the incoming president has a viable situation on his or her hands when faced with the choice of whether to quit or fight. Because as Bacevich notes, generalship is political. Military and political strategy call for concessions to appease those whose compliance or alliance you require. Sometimes they are feints that allow you to set undeniable conditions for the next phase of the battle.
You’ll remember Bacevich as the Vietnam-era West Point grad and career soldier who has criticism and then disparaged the cause his son fought and died for last spring in Iraq. It was a horribly traumatic event, and attempting anything like analysis in the immediate aftermath was ill-advised. I remember when he welcomed me back from the invasion of Iraq with some talk about combat and armored assaults and the remark that, unlike his war, we had won ours. When events in Iraq took a downturn, he became a harsh critic. I went to Lt. Bacevich’s funeral. It was not an assignment, though I wrote about it. I admired Prof. Bacevich’s stoic refusal at that time to rise to the media’s anti-war bait, but then was disappointed to see him succumb.
I wish I could take at face value Bacevich’s acknowledgement of the surge’s success and admonishments to politicians who won’t chase down and destroy an enemy that’s on the run. I wish I could say welcome back, Andy. We need you. Your country needs you. Now, rather than slamming the general who is trying to deal with a vile and divisive political environment, dangerously close to untenable, that you helped fuel in your position as warrior/scholar and bereaved father, you could unreservedly throw your support to this cause your son gave his life for, and fight to see that his sacrifice is not in vain.
Previously:
Posted by Jules Crittenden at 12:26 pm on Friday, October 5, 2007
One Response to “About Face?”
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October 5th, 2007 at 3:47 pm
I do not believe the parents/relatives of our fallen to be reliable political or policy markers on either side due to the staggering emotional toll it must take. I do tend to hew towards the idea that we should make sure that their ultimate sacrifice was not in vain. While that is now a politcally charged postion, and I would hope it would be my postion whoever was leading the country, I cannot say what such a loss would do to me. May God comfort the Professor in his loss and may God bless his heroic son.