Frontline’s Haditha: “Rules of Engagement”
Airing on PBS Tuesday, Feb. 19. Check your local listings and make a note. Preview trailers here.
I just finished watching a review copy. If you want to know the basics on this political football, see principal participants and witnesses interviewed — Marines, Haditha survivors, reporters and lawyers — and see extensive private and military video footage and stills of 3rd Platoon, Kilo Company, 3/1 Marines in Haditha before, during and after the Nov. 19, 2005 incident, you’ll want to watch this.
Like most Frontline treatments, it is well-documented and painstakingly fair. To the extent it can be in the space of an hour, it is the story of the unit and the military, media and political history of the incident. The high points of the investigation, prosecution and defense are woven through.
Not everything is there. It starts but does not complete the job of describing what a rallying cry Haditha became for the anti-war movement, which used the incident to smear combat troops in Iraq and the Bush administration, but like much of the press, seems to have suddenly lost interest. Call me petty, but while Murtha’s massacre charges are cited for what they are, as political agenda-pushing that caused a press firestorm, I’m disappointed that the delightful video is missing, of Murtha being buttonholed to apologize after murder charges were dropped. Nonetheless, Frontline deserves credit for, in reserved fashion, showing how full of crap and quick to condemn Murtha and his fellow travellers are.
Also absent is much discussion of al Qaeda’s role, beyond the fact that Haditha was a transit route from Syria to Fallujah and Baghdad, al Qaeda was interested in reinfiltrating Haditha and that’s what they were doing that day. Marines are quoted early on dismissing massacre claims as al Qaeda-inspired propaganda. Defense attorney Gary Meyers is interviewed at length, but the documentary does not address this material citing Meyers and an intel report — which as near as I can tell never got much mainstream attention – claiming al Qaeda purposefully set out to engineer a propaganda event that day. How al Qaeda intends Marines to react is not necessarily relevant to how they do react, but is somewhat more relevant given the media and anti-war camp’s willingness to see ill intent on the part of Marines.
Iraqi accounts in the documentary are limited to specific incident accounts, and some human rights advocates’ perceptions. Again, not much from the Iraqi side on what was actually happening that day in Haditha, where someone had planted several large bombs and was shooting at the Marines as they moved in on houses they perceived as hostile. Reconstruction of combat events is limited, in that perceived sources of hostile fire, intensity of fire, and movement of principal participants are mentioned but the graphic portrayal of the flow of the fight is two dimensional, and doesn’t go much beyond aftermath stills and satellite images in which buildings and vehicles are highlighted. Iraqi witnesses emerge briefly to describe acts of execution and are dispensed with quickly, being largely discredited by defense and Naval Criminal Investigative Services forensic expert claims that what they describe is not supported by the evidence. The fact that a number of people who claim to be eyewitnesses are apparently lying isn’t scrutinized.
Many of the omissions raised above may be the result of having only an hour to explain a complex event and the difficulty of getting at trial evidence or Iraqi witnesses, and despite those limitations, “Rules of Engagement” remains a worthwhile and balanced look at the situation. But the omissions contribute to a pervading impression that Marine actions happened in a vacuum of their own creating. That is compounded by the film’s intro, portraying Haditha as a peaceful resort town where people happily swam in the Euphrates before the Americans invaded. It’s an unfortunate echo of Moore’s kite-flying paradise, but seeing as Haditha is in predominantly Sunni Anbar, maybe that’s what it was. The filmmakers neglect to add that had al Qaeda stayed out, the people of Haditha might still be happily swimming today.
In the end, as the title “Rules of Engagement” suggests, it becomes a question of what the Marines themselves perceived that day and their understanding of their rules of engagement on what constitutes a hostile threat and how they should react to it. There is considerable discussion of the subject. To steal a phrase from a Marine judge advocate, it’s a cop out on reporting the entirety of the incident, but as Frontline’s reporting suggests, nothing else much matters. The treatment tends to suggest the Marines acted as they had been told to on perceiving hostile threats … aggressively … and Frontline in balance does not appear to be willing to condemn the Marines for what they did.
But Frontline is not in the business of stating conclusions. A couple of closing quotes provide the closest thing.
Reporter Josh White of the Washington Post:
After more than two years of investigating the case — none of the Marines are charged with murder. A reflection of the complexity of the situation on the ground. There are very difficult questions about rules of engagement, about what the intent of these Marines was on that particular day. What they were responding to, and how they responded.
While the case initially was — portrayed by Iraqi civilians as a massacre, by Congressman Murtha as killings in cold blood, what the investigation has revealed since is that this was far more complicated than some execution.
It was far more complicated than a — a squad of Marines going on a rampage.
The final word goes to Marine Lt. Alex Martin, a 3/1 Marine who at production time is with the unit on its fourth Iraq deployment:
The biggest takeaway from Haditha for me was this human element where the junior subordinate leader might be a 19, 20-year-old corporal, who has to make a decision in a split second, or in a series of seconds. That will effect where he — he does a calculus of balancing the safety of the Marines, the accomplishment of the mission, the threat level of the enemy and — collateral damage. And all these other things that are going on in his mind. That he has to make in absolute seconds. Without hesitation. So the difference between, you know, murder and killing, he is judge and juror, in that split second in that environment. And that is the moral authority these young men have.
Meanwhile, Frontline is planning a two-part series, “Bush’s War,” March 24-25. Preview the trailer here. It promises to be “the definitive documentary analysis of one of the most challenging periods in the nation’s history.”
Tall claim, but could happen. That title is not overly encouraging though.
Bruce Kesler at the Democracy Project gives “Rules of Engagement” a B- with a thorough review that hits some sins of commission and offers some interesting background. B- sounds pretty good, considering:
An “A” would have likely been unattainable, given an hour and the few still open questions to be decided at upcoming court martials. Or, an “A” might only be given by a rigid partisan of one side or another, if the show marched to a one-sided tune. A “C” would be appropriate if there were disabling errors in the show, resulting in a serious overall misimpression. A “D” or “F” would be reserved for a slanted diatribe or ranting screed, better reserved for Bill Moyers or Keith Olbermann respectively.
Flopping Aces’ Hadithography here.
Different, marginally related: The first Marine Iraq amputee I interviewed happened to have lost his leg in Haditha, over a year before the events described above. You’ll be glad you met USMC corporals Peter Bagarella and Matt Boisvert, and Army PFC Paul Skarinka. You can ignore the parts where I’m counter-snarking on Bush snarkers.
Posted by Jules Crittenden at 11:02 pm on Monday, February 18, 2008
10 Responses to “Frontline’s Haditha: “Rules of Engagement””
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February 18th, 2008 at 11:29 pm
No, it isn’t, Jules. I doubt that BDS will die…In fact, I believe it’s incurable.
Jules…Theo had a bum rap from Google…What say of this?
The U.N. and Google gang
I say it stinks.
February 19th, 2008 at 2:42 am
‘Meanwhile, Frontline is planning a two-part series, “Bush’s War,”’
Why do I get the feeling that they aren’t going to be talking about the hundreds of American/British airstrikes launched against Iraq when Slick was president?
February 19th, 2008 at 11:26 am
I don’t know what happened at Haditha.
If I watch Frontline tonight, I likely still won’t know what happened at Haditha.
But I do know that John Murtha is a lily livered dork™.
And have wondered how that unindicted ABSCAM co-conspirator could preach to us about anything.
With a straight face.
February 19th, 2008 at 12:07 pm
It promises to be “the definitive documentary analysis of one of the most challenging periods in the nation’s history.”
What monumental hubris. The book isn’t even completely closed on everything that went on during WWII yet! and we still get occasional revelations about heretofore unknown aspect of WWI (like the nature of the Lusitania’s cargo)
February 19th, 2008 at 3:48 pm
Must see T.V.
In Rules of Engagement, airing Tuesday, February 19, 2008, at 9 P.M. ET on PBS (check local listings), FRONTLINE examines how the rules of war are interpreted in theory and in battle and what that says about the war in Iraq.
Jules Crittenden gives…
February 19th, 2008 at 10:48 pm
[…] right decision. Haditha was a horrible loss of life, but the decisions were correct if not perfect. Jules Crittenden reviewed the show here. Not surprised the Marines have been all but formally vindicated. Shocked as all hell that PBS […]
February 20th, 2008 at 8:52 am
[…] Jules Crittenden, “Rules of Engagement” remains a worthwhile and balanced look at the situation. […]
February 20th, 2008 at 11:00 am
Jules, I was in a city in Anbar similar (actually, quite a bit worse) than Haditha at the same time. The ROE we used was very different than that adopted by the USMC there.
Part of the problem Frontline did a good job highlighting: The shoddy, outdated training that battalion received on ROE in a COIN fight mixed with 1) a SUL who had no combat experience, and 2) veterans of Fallujah who had experience only with a ROE befitting a very different battle.
LTG Chiarelli, MG Scales, et al, did an after-action review on behalf of CMNF-I after the Haditha tragedy. The conclusions they came to were what I also believed happened — poorly led troops with a devalued perspective on civilian lives and without the proper “commander’s intent” expressed so that they understood that civilian deaths are COUNTER to the overall mission.
Oh, yeah, and the Marine officer leadership was abysmal — the cover up, the lies, the obstruction of a real investigation. That’s why the LtCol (LTC) is going through court martial, and the rest basically have seen the end to their careers.
As you know, I received some fairly swell medals for doing the exact opposite of what the Haditha Marines did under very similar circumstances in a much nastier part of Anbar. If every Soldier or Marine failed to have PID before the weapon came off “safe,” we would have many, many Hadithas and our mission in OIF would be untenable.
I say this as someone who, as a former Marine, received the same MOUT training AND USED IT IN COMBAT AT OTHER TIMES. But ROE is specific to the incident, not a cookie-cutter approach to urban combat. This is why Bing West can honestly argue that if the SUL thought his Marines were in a TIC (as it turned out, a tragically bad decision, likely made by a man inexperienced in combat), then the assault on the first house was appropriate.
But after realizing they had greased only a lot of women, kids and unarmed men, to use the same ROE on the second house was not only tragic and wrong, but criminal.
Haditha forced the USMC to take a hard look at itself, in much the same way that Abu Ghraib made those of us in the Army reflect on our core values. I never thought that our ROE made me second guess myself in combat because I was well trained (better than the rest of my Soldiers, largely because I had seen so much urban combat and was tasked out to the MTT, that had a very different conception of the value of Iraqi civilian lives), and had they been properly schooled in the importance of ROE in achieving their ultimate mission, those Marines wouldn’t have been worried, too.
The USMC in Anbar actually became a great success story. Haditha played a role in that. While I hope that none of the Haditha Marines are ultimately found to be criminally liable for what they did on that day, one can never say that they acted competently.
They never had PID on their targets. They failed to discriminate between real enemies and potential friends. They then covered up what happened with falsified sigacts, faux press releases and obstructions of NCIS investigators. The pre-deployment training they received turned out to set those Marines up to fail, and the tactical choices of the SUL (and his supervising LT, who should have realized the SGT’s lack of experience) led to tragedy.
February 20th, 2008 at 11:56 am
“How al Qaeda intends Marines to react is not necessarily relevant to how they do react, but is somewhat more relevant given the media and anti-war camp’s willingness to see ill intent on the part of Marines.”
Actually, the goal of all insurgents is to force the Gummit forces to resort to collective punishment and overwhelming force. It’s why protestors taunt and throw rocks at police…they are hoping the police will over-react…ala “Kent State Massacre”. The insurgent…having inferior forces can not hope to win unless he successfully discredits government forces.
We see it all the time in Iraq…no shortage of people blathering about “Police Death Squads”…whether they existed or not is irrelevant…the belief that they existed successfully discredited the national police. That’s 30,000 Iraqi Security Forces who were successfully sidelined by a very professional propaganda campaign.(How many forces did we end up Surging…ohh yeah…30,000)
February 20th, 2008 at 12:14 pm
The IPs commit enough atrocities to earn their own reputation. Since they also killed two IAs I knew well by placing IEDs on the ASR, perhaps one might suggest that the Ministry of the Interior doesn’t exactly have full control over IPs throughout Iraq.
To put it mildly.
It is relevant that minorities in Iraq view the IPs with a great deal of concern. One of the very great failures of MNF-I throughout OIF has been our collective inability to create civilian police forces that are responsible, competent and beholden to a central command.
We did better in the Philippines.
Another point: At the time, al Qaeda in Iraq (no longer called that, by the way) as led by Jordan’s Zarwawi was quite surprised by the USMC reaction in Haditha. Who knew that a few IEDs and SAFs would lead the American-led forces to blunder like they did? In a COIN mission, we couldn’t have done anything worse than what those Marines did that day.
For those “strategic corporals,” it was a strategic defeat for their nation.
Also, AQI and those who made the tape are NOT the same. The Hammurabi Human Rights organization might have sympathies with what they perceive to be a down-trodden Sunni minority held under the boot of American/organic Shiite occupation, but that doesn’t mean that they were coordinating their investigation of the tragedy with AQI. Quite the opposite, actually.
What is missing, too: The perspective of the IAs who were on the scene when the IED detonated on the USMC patrol. They felt the USMC used the wrong ROE, unnecessarily killed innocent people and failed to protect civilian life, which they thought the Marines increasingly were taking for granted.
In a COIN fight, we tend to want to listen to what allies closest in culture, language, caste, et al, in to the enemy have to say about our tactics.
The IAs, I think, got it about right about Haditha, and they were no fans of the insurgency.