Recruiting Trends, Theirs
Know your enemy. Small Wars Journal and DoD offer up some recent findings, with an eye to combating enemy recruitment. We’ll start at Small Wars Journal with a study of foreign jihadi recruitment trends by Clint Watts, a former US Army Infantry Officer, FBI Special Agent and Executive Officer of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, now a private consultant:
Recent information on foreign fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan provides an updated picture of future terrorist threats to Western interests. Based on newly-released detainee data from Guantanamo and foreign fighter records captured in Iraq, we can now more precisely identify trends in al-Qa’ida recruiting. Although the data tells us little about fighting inside Iraq and Afghanistan, it reveals a great deal about the modern Sunni mujahid who fights as a volunteer in Middle East conflicts.
In addition to informing the profile of al-Qa’ida’s foot soldiers, the data suggests alternative techniques for countering the organization and its foreign fighter recruits in North Africa and the Middle East. This study, which will be released serially, examines the asymmetric nature of foreign fighter recruitment, the utility of smuggling networks for counterterrorism, varying motivations for martyrdom, and trends for future terrorism analysis with the drawdown of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan.
Pdf here. Highlights:
- He is a young man who likely comes from a handful of cities in North Africa and the Middle East—what I call flashpoint cities. He is probably from a country that has a high infant mortality rate, a high unemployment rate, and few civil liberties.
- The mujahid was not mobilized by Internet content or a centralized recruiting organization but instead by a returning foreign fighter or a local religious leader. The returning fighter or religious leader told him how to travel to a country where he could engage in combat. The mujahid, and probably some friends, traveled by a commercial plane or ground transportation to a country that neighbors the conflict area and then paid a local smuggler to get him in.
- The mujahid’s financial assets and spending habits vary between countries. If he is Saudi, he will contribute significantly more money to the fight. Meanwhile, a Moroccan will give his life as a suicide bomber but does not have much cash to spare. Regardless of location, the mujahid is also likely unemployed or a student (which usually amounts to the same thing) or works as a common laborer. He is not necessarily impoverished but has time on his hands and a lack of purpose, making him more susceptible to radicalization and giving him enough free time to travel in support of jihad. If he has experience fighting, he will elect to fight; if not, he will elect to be a suicide bomber.
The study does not include Pakistan, which Watt apparently considers an entirely separate and highly dangerous kettle of fish. Not entirely clear why Pakistan is weeded out. But if you open the pdf, you’ll learn that of those included in the study, no great surprise, Saudi Arabia is a major producer of non-local mujahideen in absolute numbers and per capita. Tops in absolute numbers, second per capita. What’s most interesting is Saudi’s company.
Libya blows away the competition per capita, and comes in second in absolute numbers.
|
TABLE 1 Country |
Sinjar Fighter |
Sinjar Intens. |
Total Fighter |
Total Intensity |
|
Algeria |
40 |
0.1212 |
64 |
0.1939 |
|
Belgium |
1 |
0.2500 |
2 |
0.5000 |
|
Bosnia |
1 |
0.0549 |
2 |
0.1098 |
|
Egypt |
5 |
0.0069 |
11 |
0.0152 |
|
France |
2 |
0.0419 |
4 |
0.0837 |
|
Jordan |
12 |
0.2155 |
17 |
0.3053 |
|
Kuwait |
1 |
0.0470 |
13 |
0.6104 |
|
Lebanon |
1 |
0.0427 |
2 |
0.0853 |
|
Libya |
109 |
1.8614 |
117 |
1.9980 |
|
Mauritania |
1 |
0.0306 |
3 |
0.0917 |
|
Morocco |
35 |
0.1050 |
44 |
0.1321 |
|
S. Arabia |
232 |
0.8405 |
359 |
1.3007 |
|
Sudan |
1 |
0.0036 |
7 |
0.0254 |
|
Sweden |
1 |
0.2500 |
1 |
0.2500 |
|
Syria |
48 |
0.3358 |
57 |
0.3988 |
|
Tunisia |
30 |
0.2979 |
40 |
0.3972 |
|
Turkey |
0 |
0.0000 |
2 |
0.0028 |
|
UAE |
0 |
0.0000 |
4 |
0.1125 |
|
UK |
1 |
0.0609 |
4 |
0.2438 |
|
Yemen |
42 |
0.2837 |
144 |
0.9896 |
|
Total |
563 |
0.1676 |
897 |
0.2672 |
I thought it was supposed to be all over but the bloviating with Moammar. Maybe he needs another corrective swat or two. But the study’s author concludes the counter-recruitment focus needs to be on flashpoint cities, not countries. I don’t know. In absolutist states like Saudi and Libya, I’d think the state is half the battle.
Defeating the current cycle of foreign fighter recruitment will require the U.S. and its allies to allocate their resources like Jihadi recruiters allocate theirs: focus on the most fertile fields. This means microscopically focusing on flashpoint cities and dense social network hubs rather than nations or regions. High-producing foreign fighter countries like Saudi Arabia and Libya probably do not want to produce foreign fighters any more than the U.S. wants them to produce foreign fighters, but they have been unable to stem the tide of recruits flowing from their countries.
Saudi appears to have been increasingly onside. I dunno about that re Libya. Have you seen what that guy’s been yapping about lately?
Watt also suggests that funneling aid and military resources to national governments, grievances that fuel terrorist recruitment may be exacerbated.
The asymmetric structure of foreign fighter recruitment requires an asymmetric response. Western countries must look past international boundaries and focus on cities and hubs of radicalization. Counter-terrorism efforts must expand beyond traditional military and high-level diplomatic efforts and move towards underdeveloped soft power methods of grass roots strategic communication, economic development, and human intelligence collection focused on flashpoint cities and terrorist hubs. Successful asymmetric counter- terrorism strategies require human solutions, relying on cultural, linguistic, and low-level negotiation skills tailored to the cities of origin.
Here’s the chart on the highest-producing cities, by the way:
Table 2:
City
Country
Fighters
City %
Pop.
% Fighter
/City
Darnah
Libya
52
1.39%
60.47%
Mecca
S.Arabia
43
5.71%
21.83%
Jawf
S.Arabia
16
0.12%
8.12%
Dayr al zur
Syria
16
1.10%
43.24%
Sanaa
Yemen
14
4.85%
53.85%
Wadd
Algeria
8
0.36%
38.10%
Dara
Syria
7
0.27%
18.92%
Algiers
Algeria
5
5.22%
23.81%
Adlab
Syria
5
0.28%
13.51%
Tetuan
Morocco
5
1.09%
19.23%
Bin Arouss
Tunisia
5
0.74%
29.41%
Schippert at National Review Online adds his own AQ recruitment reading list.
Meanwhile, DoD recently offered up the following re AQ recruits:
WASHINGTON, March 18, 2008 – Information culled from 48 foreign fighters in custody of Multinational Force Iraq yields a profile for al Qaeda foreign terrorists, a senior military official said yesterday.
When analyzed, officials found that foreign terrorists had comparable recruitment stories, including why they joined al Qaeda and what they did once they were smuggled into Iraq, said Air Force Col. Donald Bacon, chief of special operations and intelligence information for Multinational Force Iraq. Bacon spoke with online journalists and “bloggers” during a conference call.
All of the captured or surrendered foreign terrorists were single men, and they averaged 22 years of age. Most worked blue-collar jobs and had little-to-no education or military experience, Bacon said.
All the foreign terrorists came from large families, and standing out was a prime motivator for joining al Qaeda. However, Bacon said, interrogators were interested to find that while foreign fighters said they joined al Qaeda to “make their mark,” most were reluctant to tell their families for fear of disapproval.
Multinational Force Iraq interrogators also discovered that al Qaeda misled recruits about the situation in Iraq.
“The overwhelming point from the 48 (foreign terrorists in custody) is they came to Iraq expecting to see Americans get killed, yet what they primarily saw was Iraqis getting killed, and it bothered them,” Bacon said. “They did not come to kill Iraqis.”
He said the foreign fighters were discouraged to find the expectations al Qaeda instilled in them were not reality upon arriving in Iraq. They came to Iraq expecting to see al Qaeda victorious instead of being defeated, he said.
Multinational Force Iraq officials learned from the foreign terrorists that al Qaeda recruiters prey on young men they deem to be impressionable and lonely, Bacon said. They target recruits at mosques or at their jobs.
“In all cases, the recruiter offered friendship and also offered to teach the future foreign terrorist the basics of Islam … and that’s how the relationship started,” he explained.
The foreign fighters revealed that they are usually flown into the airport in Damascus, Syria, and then they are smuggled into Iraq in a process that could take months, he said.
The fighters described their treatment from fellow al Qaeda members and Iraqis as harsh upon their arrival in Iraq. They felt looked down upon by the Iraqis and feared revealing their foreign identity to locals, he said.
Additionally, he said, officials found out that most of the foreign terrorists had signed up to be fighters but were pressured by al Qaeda to become suicide bombers.
“They were told, ‘This is your duty. This is what we need you to do for the Jihad. You could be more useful as a suicide bomber than you could be a fighter. You’ll be a martyr and this is what we need you to do to win,’” he said.
Ninety percent of suicide bombings in Iraq are carried out by foreign terrorists, Bacon said, making them the most lethal of all insurgents.
“They produce the most destruction and cause the most civilian casualties,” he said.
Coalition forces are working with the Iraqi government to tighten border controls, and the number of foreign terrorists entering the country has been reduced to between 40 and 50 a month, compared to an estimated 120 entries in June, he explained.
Topics: al qaeda
Posted by Jules Crittenden at 9:38 am on Thursday, April 17, 2008
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April 17th, 2008 at 11:22 am
Web Reconnaissance for 04/17/2008
A short recon of whats out there that might draw your attention, updated throughout the day…so check back often.
April 17th, 2008 at 11:08 pm
My guess is that Saudi Intelligence paid for those guys tickets. Nice move send the malcontents out of town and have the Americans make sure they don’t come back in one piece. Libya may be working the same angle.