Yon Afghanistan

Yon, out of Afghanistan, headed for Iraq, announces we’re losing in the ‘Stan, then clarifies to say that we can win, but we need to fight, and send more troops … the useful Greater Anglosphere kind, not the useless Euro kind, please see to it President-elect Obama, don’t go wobbly and don’t screw up Iraq. Actually, it’s called “Afghan Quicksand Awaits Obama.” Notes that the Taliban isn’t doing itself any favors, either. Afghan news, views, and technical roundup: 

Mostly they destroy things that their countrymen want — including peace and the prospect of increased prosperity. They cut off lips and noses and douse women with gasoline and burn them alive. Just recently, a group of enemies apparently tried to bait us into killing a wedding party.

Which is, of course, along with the additional troops and training up of the Afghan army, the ground to exploit. As Yon and others have noted, talk is good, but you have to do it from a position of strength. The rising “we’re losing” chorus seems a little extreme given the circumstances. That presumes we’re going to give up, and even the Party of Surrender isn’t there … yet.

OK, how much trouble? After you’re done with Yon, some news and light reading:

The Forever War,” Dexter Filkins. I just finished this magnificent book, more Iraq than Afghanistan but a must-read for anyone who is trying to understand these wars, especially for its look inside a quagmire that isn’t one anymore.

Small Wars Journal with Getting the Basics Right in Afghanistan. This is a late add to the roundup and I’m heading out the door, so no time to read yet, but it looks interesting. Here’s a teaser:

Although there is much to do at the strategic level in Afghanistan … it is at the tactical level … that the most immediate and tangible change for good can be made. Tactical actions resonate throughout the local communities ISAF troops are supposed to protect and influence audiences across the world. And, because insurgency is a violent political competition, tactical actions can have significant political impact.

The ever essential SWJ with a critical look at Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Khost, once a model, now according to Ensign Rbert J. Bebber, USN “Information Warfare officer,” in trouble. His thoughts on why and what to do about it. Flirts with bureaucratic, wonkish discussion but veers away into what appear to be practical, experience-based observations and suggestions. Fun observation about NGO alarm about the military moving in on their humanitarian turf … you’d think the military acting humanitarian would be a good thing, and as Bebber notes, it isn’t like the NGOs can operate in a lot of those areas. The underlying message, if any adjustment to PRTs is to be worthwhile, is Yon’s point: more security.

Commander Hallett of Supreme Allied Command on NATO Lessons Learned, also at SWJ, has a loftier, somewhat more bureaucratic take in The Potential of PRTs. So much so that I have no idea what he’s talking about. My eyes glazed over before I could figure out whether he makes more, less or as much sense as the ensign or not. He appears to have advanced in rank beyond the need to communicate in English.

Backing out of that thicket, here are some quick and dirty COIN principles, from Col. Robert C. Jones.

I may have posted this one before, but here it is again. Ret’d Col Joe Collins: To Further Afghan Reconciliation, Fight Harder. We’;ve circled back to Yon’s point that it doesn’t make much sense to talk to the Taliban until you’re kicking Taliban ass.  Which will also make all that PRT stuff easier.

Complicating factors/news:

AP: Karzai accuses U.S. troops of killing 14 raodwork security guards. U.S. says the heavily armed group of men shouldn’t have fired on them. AP politely notes the Taliban has been purposefully using civilians to create incidents, and is purposefully responsible for twice as much civilian death as the U.S. is accidentally … or by Taliban design.

LA Times on the same incident includes the news that a large convoy full of military supplies — 13 vehicles — was commadeered in the Khyber Pass. Large unprotected convoy? More on that via Long War Journal.

Bloomberg: Obama’s Afghan War plan may run into weary public, deficit. I have an idea. Take it out of the social engineering budget. Not much point in any of that if we have al-Qaeda staging out of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran threatening to nuke people and Iraq gone back to the dogs.

“The Case for Withdrawal From Afghanistan” at Foreign Policy In Focus: A Think Tank Without Walls … which explains why this essay doesn’t manage to hold the roof up. Kicks off with a big MLK Jr non-violence quote. Someone needs to explain to Sameer Dossani that the head-sawing, airplane-into-office-building crowd don’t embarrass as easy as the Southern sheriffs did, and MLK Jr. had the president of the United States behind him … much like Afghanistan does, for the moment.

NYT: $180 Million hydroelectric project could bring much of southern Afghanistan into the late 19th century, boost economic development. Includes substations and power lines. Better get some security on that. They had to sneak the turbine in under a news blackout and heavy cover, dodging heavy fighting.

Blackfive: Soldiers in Afghanistan react to the election.

Mudville as always has a good ground-level Afghan roundup. Scroll down for that but give Iraq a look on the way.

Gateway with the latest from al-Qaeda’s Forward Observer, I mean NYT. U.S. spec ops raided into Pakistan, Syria. A Rumsfeld-era Bush admin special order allows U.S. troops to chase AQ anywhere. They need a special order for that? I thought the January 2002 SOTU pretty much covered it. Might be a good one for the incoming Obama admin to ditch, anyway, as long as they are dismantling Guantanamo. Because you know it’s just another reason why they hate us.

Welcome Instapundit, etal, always good to see you. Come on in. We’re observing Veterans’ Days … and nights.


Topics: Afghanistan, military

  Posted by Jules Crittenden at 9:35 pm Comments (0) on Monday, November 10, 2008

Leave a Reply

Trackback URL

You must be logged in to post a comment.