About That ISI Problem
Top U.S. brass turn up the heat. BBC:
In recent days three top American generals have turned their guns on Pakistan, accusing elements of its main intelligence agency, the ISI, of supporting Taleban and al-Qaeda militants.
The unprecedented broadside followed the announcement by the US President Barack Obama of a new strategy for Afghanistan.
Mr Obama cited as its cornerstone the need to destroy militant safe havens in the Pakistani tribal belt along the Afghan border, something he knows can’t be achieved without complete cooperation from the country’s army and intelligence.
To win, or compel, such support, the president and his generals have offered a mixture of incentives and warnings: for example, an increase in civilian aid alongside a warning that there’s no “blank cheque” for the military if it doesn’t perform.
The charges against the ISI seem to be part of the latter. They are not new, but have never before been made so publicly.
The chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, said elements of the ISI maintain links with militants on Pakistan’s borders with both Afghanistan and India.
General David Petraeus, head of the US Central Command, spoke of cases “in the fairly recent past” where the ISI appeared to have warned militants that their positions had been discovered.
According to the New York Times, Pakistani support to Taleban commanders extends to “money, military supplies and strategic planning guidance”.
Last year Washington’s suspicions were such that it scaled down intelligence sharing with the ISI, especially after accusing it of involvement in the July bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul.
The charge of collusion is rigorously denied by Pakistani officials.
Maybe they should try aiming Hellfires at ISI offices. Could send a message, while also eliminating a pesky source of Taliban support. Threatswatch, with more Pak-Afghan links, sees the new push being tied to concerns about Nawaz Sharif’s recent political moves and his Islamist background. Which may be an added impetous to act, though as the Beeb suggests this is an escalation of concerns and action that goes back a way, but suffered from inattention in recent months. Missiles up ISI’s Shawa camises may be an attractive notion but more practical is tying not only military aid to military performance, but civilian aid to civilian political performance, with a major housecleaning topping both lists, and holding back any payments until that happens. Discussion at Belmont Club notes Ahmed Rashid’s doubts that Pakistan can be pressured. How about bought? Or rented. Short answer to a long word problem: There is no easy out of this this war. It doesn’t end with a surge, Afghanistan stabilized, and the walkaway that the Obama admin would like … any more than Iraq does. In one form or another, this war goes on for a very long time. The Obama admin is right to focus on Pakistan, encouraging good behavior and bolstering moderates. The question is whether it can do so effectively, or if it is just throwing money down what is effectively an Islamist hole.
Foreign Policy chimes in with a timely Idiot’s Guide to Pakistan, a quick and dirty cocktail party primer focused mainly on combatant parties, who they hate and what they like. FP’s Zelikow offers 10 analytic variables re Obama’s Af-Pak plan. The top four are about Pakistan. The top two are about Pakistan’s intentions and direction going forward.
Topics: Afghanistan, Obama, Pakistan, military
Posted by Jules Crittenden at 7:02 am Comments (0) on Monday, March 30, 2009
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